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RECENT BOOKS 
THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REvoLUTION IN RETROSPECT. 
By Bernard Schwartz. New York: The Ronald Press Co. 1957. Pp. vii, 
429. $6.50. 
It is apparent to any student of the subject that our constitutional 
law has undergone an extensive overhauling during the past twenty years, 
and it is accurate to say that we have experienced a period of constitutional 
revolution via the peaceful method of the judicial process. Professor 
Schwartz in his excellent book has undertaken an appraisal of this develop-
ment. Chapter by chapter he reviews the major decisions and developments 
during the period under review in all the important areas of constitutional 
adjudication. But while the book provides an accurate and well organized 
picture of the course of the decisional law, the author has been concerned 
also to depict the major emphases and trends, the direction in which 
judicial review is moving, and in tum to state his own appraisal of these 
emphases and trends. It· is a very useful and stimulating part of Professor 
Schwartz's book that he subjects decisions and opinions to critical examina-
tion and states his own views in a straightforward way. 
Two major facets of our constitutional development as reflected in 
the decisional process in the recent decades have been, first, the expanded 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause power in order to enlarge the 
range of the federal government's legislative authority in dealing with 
the nation's economic problems and, secondly, the reduced significance, if 
not complete elimination, of the Due Process Clause as a source of sub-
stantive rights in restricting the power of Congress and of the states to 
deal with economic affairs. On the whole, Professor Schwartz approves of 
these two major developments since they reflect the policy of judicial self-
restraint and deference to the -legislative body which he regards as vital 
to the process of judicial review in the sphere of constitutional litigation. 
(Pp. 10-38, 367-372) It is apparent that Professor Schwartz subscribes to 
the Holmes-Frankfurter theory of judicial austerity, i.e., that the courts 
in deference to legislative power and policy should refrain from declaring 
legislation unconstitutional as long as the Court finds that the legislative 
scheme does not lack rationality. Indeed Professor Schwartz states that 
judicial review is essentially undemocratic in character, that the Court by 
very nature will lag behind public opinion and that judicial review accord-
ingly should be sparingly exercised in deference to the democratic process. 
(Pp. 7-10, 370-372) He regards the Commerce Clause interpretations and 
the decline of substantive due process at least in its economic liberty 
connotations as desirable manifestations of the kind of judicial self-
restraint which he believes to be imperative. Moreover, Professor Schwartz 
regards these recent lines of decisions which have enlarged the Commerce 
Clause and drained the Due Process Clause of much of its earlier meaning 
as a healthful and desirable return to earlier lines of authority which 
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evidenced the same type of judicial restraint which the Court is now dis-
playing. Whether or not Professor Schwartz is correct in his assertion 
that the Court is merely restoring its earlier correct positions depends of 
course on presuppositions as to the point in time when the correct practice 
was found. That John Marshall's thinking expressed in McCulloch v. 
Maryland,1 and Gibbons v. Ogden2 should serve as a pattern for the 
operation of the judicial process in construing congressio:µal powers is 
readily understandable. But what was the initially correct position on 
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a restraint on the power of the states? No easy answer suggests 
itself. 
To say that Professor Schwartz approves of major developments that 
evidence considerable judicial self-restraint in the review of -legislative 
acts is not to say that Professor Schwartz is uncritical of the Supreme 
Court's decisions during the recent decades. On the contrary, he evidences 
on the whole a conservative approach to constitutional interpretation 
and is concerned that the Court exercise its proper function in our judicial 
system. The point he stresses is that the Court concern itself with questions 
of constitutional power and that it not confuse questions of power with 
questions of wise policy. The Court should not sit as a super-legislative 
body. The author's overall position appears to be that the Court should 
not invalidate legislation unless it either violates an express prohibition 
of the Constitution or unless it is an unreasonable exercise of legislative 
power. (P. 59) But the Court should not confuse "reasonableness" with 
"rightness." (P. 310) Moreover, the judges of the Supreme Court should 
not make their own conceptions of values the standards of constitutional 
interpretation. It may be noted for instance that the author is critical of 
the idea expressed in a number of Supreme Court opinions during the 
1940-1950 decade to the effect that the First Amendment freedoms have 
a preferred place in our constitutional scheme of things. (Pp. 231-240, 
311-312) He rejects this conception that appears to him to place a high 
value on First Amendment freedoms as the kind of judicial subjectivity 
that led the Court astray in an earlier day. He agrees with Justice Frank-
furter that judges have no business saying that some constitutional limita-
tions are more important than others. Elevation of free speech to a position 
of primary importance is as much an abuse of judicial authority as the 
earlier judicial attempts to place economic liberty on a high pedestal. 
(Pp. 237-238) -
In accordance with this same philosophy he is critical of the type of 
individualism that has distinguished the Court in recent years. He regards 
the great plethora of separate opinions-dissenting and concurring-as 
a factor weakening the Court's prestige and impairing its effectiveness and 
14 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). 
2 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824). 
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dignity as a collegiate body. (Pp. 354-362) Dissenting opinions in Professor 
Schwartz's view should be written only under very special circumstances 
where the expression of a separate opinion will be a positive contribution 
to the development of the law, and even then the privilege of dissent 
should be exercised with a sense of responsibility and self-restraint. (Pp. 360-
362) Moreover, in the interest of stability the Court should be slow to 
overrule well established precedents, and the rule of stare decisis should 
be generally observed by the Court in the field of constitutional adjudica-
tion except when it is clear that prior decisions rested on an erroneous 
exercise of judicial power.3 Accordingly, Professor Schwartz has little 
patience with the Black-Douglas attempt to revive the questions whether 
corporations are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment (Pp. 350-351) 
or whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be equated with the Bill 
of Rights as distinguished from the classic interpretation in terms of funda-
mental rights. (Pp. 163-167) Respecting Justice Black's dissenting opinion 
in the Adamson case,4 Professor Schwartz questions the propriety of Justice 
Black's resting his conclusions on his own interpretation of history when 
this whole question of historical intent was not briefed or argued before 
the Court and did not receive full consideration by all the members of 
the Court at that time. 
Space does not permit any detailed review of Professor Schwartz's 
comments on all the specific cases he discusses in the course of his various 
chapters. He reviews the judicial decisions relating to the powers of 
Congress, the powers of the President, administrative agencies, the place of 
the courts, the states, the individual, the war power, the cold war, and 
concludes with a chapter entitled "Anatomy and Pathology of the Court," 
the chapter in which he discusses stare decisis in constitutional adjudication, 
activism, dissenting opinions (Dissentio ad Absurdum), liberalism vs. 
conservatism on the bench, and the general subject of judicial deference to 
the legislative will. The reader will find the chapters provocative and 
rewarding. Although a detailed review will not be attempted, attention 
will be called to some of his criticisms and comments as set forth. below 
in order to give the reader some idea of the book's flavor and the author's 
thinking. 
While it must be recognized that Congress under the Commerce Clause 
has a broad power of regulation over the nation's economy, it is ques-
tionable whether this power should be so widely construed by applying 
s The author approves of .the Court's post-1937 overruling of prior decisions restrict-
ing the reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and limiting federal 
and state legislative power to deal with economic problems by reference to the economic 
liberty concept developed under the Due Process Clause, since in his opinion these 
decisions represented an overreaching of the judicial power at the expense of legislative 
power to deal with new situations and marked a departure from the earlier and correct. 
policy of judicial deference to legislative judgment in policy-making areas. 
4 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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a theory of interrelation of all economic activities that the distinction 
between national and local commerce is completely obliterated. (P. 39) 
The Court's decision in the Kahriger case5 in effect permits Congress 
to make a spurious use of the taxing power as a means of regulating 
criminal activity that should be left to the states. (Pp. 51-53) The con-
gressional investigatory power is important, and the Supreme Court should 
be very slow to interfere with the internal function of a coordinate branch 
of the government. (Pp. 53-57) (It would be interesting to get Professor 
Schwartz's comments on the recent Watkins case6 holding invalid contempt 
convictions based on refusal to answer questions put by a congressional 
committee.) ' 
According to the author, the Court has shown undue deference to 
the executive authority. (Pp. 64-70) The steel seizure decision7 is approved 
as a desirable affirmation of judicial power to curb the executive in order 
to maintain the supremacy of Congress in the determination of legislative 
policy. (Pp. 76-81, 94) The Court has shown extreme tolerance in dealing 
with executive power so far as the handling of foreign affairs is concerned. 
Professor Schwartz points out that the Court went out of its way in the 
Belmont and Pink cases8 to broaden the legal significance of executive 
agreements and to elevate these agreements to the level of treaties in 
overriding state law and policy. (Pp. 86-93) Because he feels that it is 
in the sphere of executive review of administrative action that the courts 
have a very useful function to perform, Professor Schwartz, after observing 
that Congress in recent years has granted authority to administrative 
agencies in such broad terms that for all practical purpose it amounts to 
the granting of carte blanche power to these agencies to define policy, 
notes with apparent regret that the Court has virtually repudiated the 
idea that Congress cannot delegate its power without setting up some 
meaningful standards which serve as barriers to the aggrandizement of 
administrative authority. (Pp. 102-108) The author is also critical of the 
attitude taken by the post-1937 Court in deference to administrative 
agencies and its resulting reluctance to review the actions of these agencies. 
(Pp. 108-120) Judicial deference to the legislature does not require the 
courts "to leave everything to the administrative expert." (P. 139) Professor 
Schwartz is enthusiastic about the Administrative Procedure Act, is glad 
that the courts have given it a sympathetic interpretation and is hopeful 
that they will continue to do so in the interest of furnishing a more effec-
tive vehicle of judicial review that will limit the opportunities for the 
arbitrary exercise of administrative authority. (Pp. 120-139) 
5 United States v. K.ahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). 
6 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
7 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
s United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 
203 (1942). 
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In his chapter entitled "The Individual," the author, while rejecting 
the idea that the First Amendment freedoms are preferred and while 
commending the Court for the more recent rejection of this idea (Pp. 231-
240), examines and approves the decisions invalidating restrictions on 
Jehovah's Witnesses (Pp. 240-245), criticizes the Struthers decision9 as a 
doctrinaire application of the First Amendment freedoms without taking 
into account the importance of preserving the privacy of the home 
(Pp. 248-249), approves the later decisions which have restored state con-
trol over picketing as against the Thornhill doctrine10 that this was protect-
ed free speech (Pp. 250-253), approves the application of the free press 
limitation to the movies and feels that movies should not be subject to 
prior restraint any more than any other medium of expression (Pp. 253-
257), and rejects the absolute application of the separation-of-church-and-
state concept but disapproves of the result in the Zorach case.11 (Pp. 256-
263) So far as equal protection of the Negro is concerned, the author is clear 
that under the post-Civil War amendments race furnishes no basis for 
classification and that the recent decisions including the desegregation 
decisions must be supported as a proper performance by the Court of its 
duty to enforce constitutional limitations. (Pp. 263-275) 
Legislative efforts to combat the subversive activity come in for con-
sideration in the chapter on the cold war period. The Dennis decision12 
is approved as another instance of judicial deference in an area where the 
judgment of Congress on the need and desirability of restrictions must 
be given great weight. (Pp. 308-319) Attacking the procedures used in 
the loyalty-security program relating to federal employees, procedures 
which permit the use of "faceless" informers and which can be justified 
only by reference to the discredited dogma that public employment is a 
privilege and not a right, the author regrets that the Court has not used 
its most recent opportunities to condemn these procedures on the ground 
that they violate constitutional right. (Pp. 323-329) However, the decision 
in the Cole case13 resting on statutory grounds, has contributed to the 
end result of developing a more equitable and effective program. (Pp. 329-
331) The decisions permitting the use of confidential information in the 
selective service and deportation cases are characterized as administrative 
law distortions that reflect upon our traditions of fair play. (Pp. 331-335) 
In his comments on the Rosenberg case,14 the author, while not doubting 
the justice of the end result, asserts that the Supreme Court acted with 
undue haste in its handling of the matter. (Pp. 335-341) 
It is not possible within the limits of this review to pass judgment on 
9 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
10 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
11 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
12 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
13 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). 
14 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953). 
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Professor Schwartz's conclusions on the various matters including those 
mentioned above. It is enough to say that his book evidences an astute 
understanding of the development of our constitutional case law during the 
past two decades, that his discussion is well organized and that his com-
ments are always penetrating, illuminating and interesting. Perhaps the 
favorable impression made on the reviewer by the book is due to the fact 
that he shares many of the author's conclusions. 
By way of general comment it should be noted that Professor Schwartz 
probably is somewhat premature in announcing that the Court is now 
following an overall policy of self-restraint. Indeed, it may be assumed 
in the light of the Court's overall performance that the degree of self-
restraint exercised by it will vary from time to time depending on the 
Court's personnel. The decisions announced during the past term of the 
Court, as presently constituted under Chief Justice Warren, evidence 
considerable "activism" as opposed to self-restraint. One may note, for 
instance, the decision in the Watkins case,15 resulting in a substantial 
practical limitation on the power of congressional committees to ask 
questions, the decisions denying to Congress the power to authorize military 
trials for civilian dependents accompanying members of the armed forces 
abroad,16 and the decision in the Yates case17 which while not formally 
resting on constitutional grounds has the practical effect of undermining 
the Dennis decision. These decisions hardly evidence a policy of judicial 
austerity premised on deference to congressional power and policy. 
Secondly, the problem of the judicial function in respect to adjudication 
of constitutional issues cannot be resolved in the neat and clear-cut man-
ner indicated by Professor Schwartz's formula. He would have the Court 
declare legislation invalid only if it conflicts with specific limitations or 
is an unreasonable exercise of power in the Holmesian sense.18 (P. 59) 
Yet the judicial solution to constitutional questions by reference to these 
two standards as guides to the judicial process is not simple; it requires 
the exercise of judgment and calls for a balancing of the ends served by 
legislative policy as against the rights that are claimed to be violated. 
Judicial enforcement of "specific restraints" is a more complex task 
15 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
16 Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Kxueger, 354 U.S. I (1957). 
17 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
18 At several points the author seems to make clear that in his opinion it is ap-
propriate for the Court to review the "reasonableness" of legislation in the sense of in-
quiring whether there is some rational basis for the legislation. On the other hand, he 
seems to approve what he regards as the Court's present policy of self-restraint _pursuant 
to which it will uphold legislation unless it "patently violates an express constitutional 
provision." (P. 23) Judicial review of the "reasonableness" of legislation obviously in. 
volves a wider power of review than that limited to the inquiry whether the legislation 
violates a specific constitutional limitation. The difference between the two is indicated 
by the difference between Justice Roberts' opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
!;102 (1934), and Justice Black's opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern 
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). 
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than the word "specific" suggests. Explicit constitutional limitations 
assume various degrees of specificity. The right to a jury trial can be given 
a very specific content by reference to the common law definition of the 
institution. On the other hand, the First Amendment limitations, often 
characterized as specific restraints when contrasted with the generality of 
the Due Process Clause, open up large vistas of meaning and interpretation. 
Does obscene literature enjoy protection under the First Amendment and 
to what extent may Congress use its powers under the Commerce Clause 
to curb the distribution of this kind of literature? It is quite clear that 
in answering these questions the Court must appraise and weigh opposing 
interests of considerable importance. Does deference to legislative judg-
ment or does judicial concern for the value embodied in the specific re-
straint control the decision? 
Likewise, judicial review of the "reasonableness" of the exercise of 
legislative power calls for a pragmatic balance-of-interest judgment that 
must of necessity take some account of the wisdom, necessity and justice 
of legislative policy. Nor is it conclusive to use Holmes' reasonable man 
test, i.e., would a rational man say that this is a reasonable way to deal 
with the problem? Even this test involves a considerable measure of 
judicial subjectivity. Who is to determine the thinking of the rational 
man? He is an abstraction, and in the end the judge creates an image of 
the rational man by reference to the judge's own conception of rationality. 
In other words when a judge says that a rational man would regard a 
given legislative act as reasonable, he is really saying that the judge finds 
that rational arguments can be made to support the objectives of the legis-
lation and the means employed to effectuate these objectives. This is of 
course far different from saying that the judge thinks that the legislation 
is desirable or right. On the other hand, the inquiry into reasonableness 
is meaningless unless it penetrates to the grounds that lead the legislature 
to conclude that this is wise, desirable and just legislation.19 At this point 
the judge is thrown upon his own resources and the frame of reference 
within which he operates. Judges may therefore disagree on the rationality 
of legislation. The difference between the Holmes and Brandeis opinions in 
19 At one point the author appears to recognize that a review of reasonableness of 
legislation involves some judgment as to the desirability of the legislation. "In applying 
a test as vague and indefinite as the above-i.e., is the statute unreasonable, unnecessary 
and arbitrary?-the Court was, in effect, determining upon its own judgment whether 
particular legislation was desirable.'' (P. 14) 
It appears to this reviewer that the author in developing this particular point has 
overstated the matter when he says that the Court prior to 1937 had set itself up "as Su-
preme Censor of the wisdom of challenged legislation." (P. 23) It may appear to the author 
that the Court in passing on the "reasonableness" of legislation must necessarily have 
been passing on the wisdom of the statute, but this reviewer doubts that any justice 
of the Court would ever assert or defend the proposition that it was the Court's function 
to serve as a super-legislature in passing final judgment on the wisdom of legislative 
policy. 
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the Pennsylvania Coal Company case20 well illustrates this point, since in 
this case two judges 9f great wisdom differed on whether a rational man 
would regard the Pennsylvania legislation under review as a reasonable 
way to deal with the problem of land subsidence induced by extraction 
of minerals. 
The reviewer has no quarrel with the test of "reasonableness." Reflect-
ing as it does the balance-of-interest technique in the process of constitu-
tional adjudication, it appears to the reviewer to be a more meaningful 
approach than one couched in the ·language of absolutism or doctrinal 
conceptualism. The point he is making is that "reasonableness" as a 
standard for the operation of the judicial process is not to be equated 
with a mechanical objectivity. On the contrary, it calls for a determination 
by the judge by reference to his own lights, his understanding and appraisal 
of the interests at stake, and the basic frame of values that condition his 
intellectual process. 
Likewise it appears to the reviewer that Professor Schwartz in attempt-
ing to objectify the process of constitutional adjudication by insisting on 
the impropriety of judicial appraisal of values is putting himself in a 
position where he appears to be an advocate of a mechanistic process of 
judgment in constitutional adjudication. The factors leading him to 
protest constitutional value appraisals by the judges are understandable. 
His criticism of the thesis that the First Amendment freedoms are preferred 
freedoms is well taken. Such a dogmatic statement is in itself a mechanical 
approach to the values and interests served by the First Amendment. 
Furthermore, Professor Schwartz is concerned with the divisiveness, individ-
ualism, and subjectivity that result when each judge interprets the Con-
stitution in such a way as to make it an image of his own sense of constitu-
tional values. The reviewer shares this concern too. But the reviewer cannot 
conceive of any rational process of constitutional adjudication in which 
the judge's conception of the values and interests served by the constitu-
tional system, and their relevancy and importance in the context of our 
contemporary political, social and economic order, can be eliminated 
from the decisional process. 
Professor Schwartz's own comments respecting many of the Court's 
decisions are based on his conception of important interests served by the 
Constitution and by his choice of the predominant interest that should 
govern the resolution of the problem presented by the case. One may 
note, for instance, his disapproval (Pp. 262-263) of the decision in the 
Zorach case21 sustaining the validity of the New York system of released 
time. Here the immediate issue is whether a system which permits the 
release on a voluntary basis of school children at the expense of one hour 
per week of public school time for the purpose of religious education 
20 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
21 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law. A judicial policy which defers to legislative judgment respecting the 
wisdom and desirability of this practice and which limits the judicial 
inquiry to the question whether a rational man would regard this prac-
tice as a reasonable means of reconciling the claims to personal liberty 
with the public's interest in opportunities for religious education points 
to the result reached in the Zorach case. But if it is argued that the real 
question is whether this practice violates the separation-of-church-and-state 
concept derived from the First Amendment, it should be observed that 
the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself represents a judicial determination that the First Amendment 
restrictions are essential to a system of ordered justice and are fundamental 
in character. This determination in itself represents an important judicial 
choice of basic values. In tum the significance of the separation concept in 
its application to the released time problem calls for a considerable 
exercise of judicial judgment in identifying, appraising and weighing 
the competing interests at stake. If Professor Schwartz thinks that the re-
leased time system should be held unconstitutional, it is because he has 
made his choice of the relevant constitutional value that should control 
the disposition of the case. 
The author recognizes that judges do and should draw upon a sense 
of natural justice that finds its inspiration in the conscience and basic 
human feelings. (Pp. 170-171) On this ground he defends the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of due process in terms of fundamental or natural 
rights and takes issue with Justice Black's criticism as expressed in his 
dissent in the Adamson case22 that the fundamental rights interpretation 
leaves constitutional questions at the mercy of uncontrolled judicial sub-
jectivity. Answering this criticism, Professor Schwartz states that the 
judge "can be expected both to be keenly perceptive to violations of basic 
canons of justice and to be sufficiently detached to avoid imposing his 
purely personal notions, not shared by other men, upon society." (P. 171) 
Although this appears to the reviewer to be a good answer, it must still 
be conceded that the judge's sensitivity to basic human values, as crystal-
lized in his own thinking and understanding, becomes a vehicle of con-
stitutional interpretation. 
But granted that the value (or policy) judgment is inevitably a part of 
the judicial process, Professor Schwartz is on solid ground in contending 
that the judicial judgment must be a disciplined and responsible judg-
ment and not simply a reflection of personal idiosyncrasies or predilections. 
Respect for the testimony of history in illuminating and authenticating 
the meaning of constitutional language, for the principles and traditions 
established by past decisions, for the institutional role of the judiciary and 
the stability and steadfastness essential to the maintenance of public con-
22 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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fidence in the judicial arm of the government, for the underlying policy 
and structural objectives of the Constitution, for the rule of law and the 
values implicit in the concept of ordered justice-all these, coupled with 
wholesome respect for the pivotal position of the democratic political 
process and the institutions of representative government in the formula-
tion of social and economic policies, are controlling and restraining forces 
which serve to correct excessive judicial subjectivity. 
The reader will have reached the conclusion by this time that Profes-
sor Schwartz's latest book not only presents an able analysis and synthesis 
of the Supreme Court's decisions during the past two decades in the impor-
tant areas of constitutional law, but also yields critical and illuminating 
observations on the judidal process at work in constitutional litigation. 
This is a good book and one that can be recommended not only for 
lawyers, law teachers and students, but also for the lay reader who has a 
sober and reflective interest in the new directions taken by our constitu-
tional law and the role of the Supreme Court in the process of constitu-
tional adjudication. 
Paul G. Kauper, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
